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GRECO ON KNOWLEDGE: 
VIRTUES, CONTEXTS, ACHIEVEMENTS 
 
 
DUNCAN PRITCHARD 
University of Edinburgh 
 
 
ABSTRACT. This paper critically discusses John Greco’s  paper, ‘What’s Wrong With 
Contextualism?’, in which he outlines of a theory of knowledge which is virtue-theoretic 
while also being allied to a form of attributer contextualism about ‘knows’. 
 
 
1. VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY AND CONTEXTUALISM 
 
John Greco is one of the foremost exponents of a view in the theory of knowledge known as 
virtue epistemology. In general, virtue epistemologists hold that at least a necessary condition 
for knowledge is that one attains a true belief via the stable and reliable cognitive traits that 
make up one’s cognitive character. What counts as a cognitive trait hereand, relatedly, 
what counts as a ‘cognitive character’will very much depend on the details of the view, 
though Greco is one of the more liberal interpreters of these notions.1 In effect, one can read 
Greco’s version of virtue epistemology as simply a refined type of reliabilism, what has been 
called an ‘agent’ or ‘virtue’ reliabilism. 
 There is an important difference between the sort of virtue-theoretic proposal that 
Greco endorsed in his earlier work and the kind of proposal that he now defends. This 
difference is significant for our purposes since it is what leads Greco to ally his virtue 
epistemological proposal to a form of attributer contextualism.2 In order to get a sense of 
                                                
1  In contrast, for example, to Linda Zagzebski who offers a very restrictive account of the cognitive abilities 
relevant to knowledge possession. See, for example, L. Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge 
UP, 1996). 
2  See, for example, J. Greco, ‘Agent Reliabilism’, Philosophical Perspectives, 13 (1999), pp. 273-96 and 
Putting Skeptics in Their Place (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000). Note that Greco’s attributer contextualism 
is very different from standard varieties, such as the sort of view endorsed by Keith DeRose, David Lewis and 
Stewart Cohen. See K. DeRose, ‘Solving the Skeptical Problem’, Philosophical Review, 104 (1994), pp. 1-52, 
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what this difference involves, it is worthwhile tracing the history behind Greco’s current 
stance. 
 Consider a simple form of process reliabilism which holds that knowledge is 
essentially just reliably-formed true belief. One of the problems facing such a view is that it is 
far too permissive, in that there are clearly cases of reliably-formed true belief which are not 
knowledge. This is where a virtue reliabilism of the type that Greco defends can come to the 
rescue. Whereas a simple process reliabilism would in principle hold that just about any 
reliable process could count as knowledge-conducive, Greco’s account restricts the range of 
knowledge-conducive reliable processes to those that make up the cognitive traits of an 
agent’s cognitive character. There is a solid rationale for a restriction of this sort, in that our 
interest in reliability surely reflects a specific interest in cognitive ability. If it is due to some 
incidental feature of the environment that I am able to reliably form a true belief about a 
certain subject matterand in no way connected to my cognitive abilitiesthen the mere 
reliability of my belief-forming processes will not suffice for knowledge (or, indeed, any 
robust epistemic standing that falls short of knowledge).  
 Suppose, for example, that one is forming one’s belief about the temperature of the 
room by looking at a thermometer. Suppose further that this is indeed a very reliable way of 
forming beliefs about this subject matter, but that its reliability is entirely unconnected with 
any cognitive ability of mine. For example, imagine that the thermometer is in fact broken 
and is fluctuating randomly within a certain range. Nevertheless, the reliability of the belief-
forming process in question is preserved because there is someone hidden in the room, next 
to the room’s thermostat, who is ensuring that every time one goes to check the reading on 
the thermometer, the temperature is adjusted to correspond with what it says on the 
thermometer.  
 Intuitively, even despite the reliability in play here, one does not know what one 
believes, and a natural explanation of this is that the reliability in question is of the wrong 
                                                                                                                                                  
D. Lewis, ‘Elusive Knowledge’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74 (1995), pp. 549-67, and S. Cohen, 
‘Contextualism and Skepticism’, Philosophical Issues, 10 (2000), pp. 94-107. This is because on Greco’s view 
the context of someone other than the attributer’s can be the relevant one. In this way Greco can accommodate 
some of the intuitions behind the subject-sensitive invariantist view defended by John Hawthorne and Jason 
Stanley. See J. Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004), and J. Stanley, Knowledge 
and Practical Interests (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2005). Nevertheless, since Greco’s view does allow the attributer’s 
context to sometimes be the relevant context, I think it is acceptable to describe his view as a form of attributer 
contextualism, so long as one keeps this qualification in mind. Henceforth, I will describe his view in this way 
without qualification. 
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sort since it doesn’t reflect any genuine cognitive ability on my part. Put another way, what 
we want when we are interested in reliability is to capture some sense in which, through 
ability, one’s beliefs are sensitive to the facts whereas what we have in this case is a 
reliability that results when the facts are sensitive to what one believes. It should be clear that 
the move to a virtue reliabilist theory will deal with problems of this sort since the reliability 
in question in this case does not in any way reflect the cognitive character of the agent; it has 
nothing to do with the agent’s cognitive abilities.  
 Interestingly, however, it was part-and-parcel of Greco’s earlier view to concede that 
a virtue reliabilism would be unable to accommodate a range of difficult cases by itself. In 
particular, the thought was that one could form true beliefs through one’s cognitive skill and 
yet the relationship between cognitive success and cognitive skill be impeded in such a way 
that it was a matter of luck that the belief in question was true. In such cases one would not 
know, even though one’s true belief met the virtue-theoretic condition on knowledge laid 
down by Greco’s virtue reliabilism. 
 For example, consider the case of Roddy who is looking into a field and sees a sheep-
shaped object. Using his highly reliable cognitive abilities he forms a belief that there is a 
sheep in the field. Moreover, his belief is true. Nevertheless, he does not know that there is a 
sheep in the field because it is a matter of luck that his belief is true, even despite the 
cognitive abilities in play. This is because what Roddy is looking at is not a sheep at all, but 
rather a big hairy dog. However, there is, fortuitously, a sheep in the field, hidden from view 
behind the sheep-shaped object that Roddy is looking at. 
 Since the reliability in question here is clearly appropriately related to the relevant 
cognitive abilities of the agent, it seems that in order for virtue reliabilism to offer an 
adequate account of knowledge it must supplement the view with some further anti-luck 
condition, such as a ‘safety’ condition (roughly, that the belief in question could not have 
easily been wrong).3 In more recent work, however, Greco has seen a way around this 
problem that seems to be in keeping with the virtue-theoretic approach to knowledge.4 
                                                
3  For more on safety, see E. Sosa, ‘How to Defeat Opposition to Moore’, Philosophical Perspectives, 13 
(2000), pp. 141-54, and D. Pritchard, ‘Resurrecting the Moorean Response to the Sceptic’, International 
Journal of Philosophical Studies, 10 (2002), pp. 283-307, Epistemic Luck (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2005), at ch. 6, 
and ‘Anti-Luck Epistemology’, Synthese, 156 (2007). 
4  See, for example, J. Greco, ‘Knowledge as Credit for True Belief’, in M. DePaul & L. Zagzebski (eds.), 
Intellectual Virtue (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003), pp. 111-34, and ‘The Value Problem’, in A. Haddock, A. Millar 
& D. H. Pritchard (eds.), The Value of Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford UP, forthcoming). 
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Moreover, as we will see, it is this change in his view that has led him to ally his virtue 
epistemology to a version of attributer contextualism. 
 The change in question is to insist that knowledge is not merely the conjunction of 
cognitive ability and cognitive success, but is rather cognitive success that is because of 
cognitive ability. Intuitively, the addition of this relation between cognitive success and 
cognitive ability will deal with the case just given since we would naturally say that while 
Roddy is exhibiting the relevant cognitive abilities and is cognitively successful, his cognitive 
success is not because of his cognitive abilities, but is rather due to some incidental feature in 
the environment (in this case that there happens to be a sheep hidden from view behind the 
sheep-shaped object that he is looking at). If this proposal can indeed deal with cases of this 
sort, then it seems that a virtue reliabilism may well constitute a more complete account of 
knowledge. 
 Interestingly, there may be an additional benefit to thinking of knowledge in these 
terms, as Greco makes clear elsewhere, in that knowledge is now being understood in such a 
way as to account for why we tend to regard knowledge as distinctively valuable.5 This is 
because knowledge is now being understood in terms of cognitive success that is because of 
cognitive skill. As Greco argues, however, a plausible definition of an achievement is success 
that is because of skill, and so knowledge, on his view, turns out to be a particular type of 
achievement (i.e., a cognitive achievement). This is important because achievements tend to 
be the sort of thing that accrue a distinctive form of value that is lacking in successes that do 
not constitute achievements (e.g., lucky successes). If this is right, then it is unsurprising that 
we tend to suppose that knowledge is distinctively valuable, since we regard achievements in 
general as distinctively valuable and knowledge is just a type of achievement which is 
specifically cognitive.6  
 According to Greco, the reason why the introduction of this ‘because of’ clause into 
the virtue reliabilist proposal naturally leads to the adoption of a version of attributer 
contextualism about ‘knows’ is that to say that cognitive success is because of cognitive 
ability is to say that the cognitive abilities in question were the salient factors in explaining 
                                                
5  J. Greco, ‘The Value Problem’. 
6  For further discussion of this virtue-theoretic proposal as regards the value of knowledge, see D. Pritchard, 
‘Recent Work on Epistemic Value’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 44 (2007), pp. 85-110, at §4, ‘Virtue 
Epistemology and Epistemic Luck, Revisited’, Metaphilosophy, 38 (2007),  and ‘Knowledge, Understanding 
and Epistemic Value’, in A. O’Hear (ed.), Epistemology (Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures) (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, forthcoming). 
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the cognitive success. Put more simply, to say that cognitive success is because of cognitive 
ability is to say that the cognitive abilities in question explain the cognitive success. 
Moreover, Greco wants to argue that this isn’t a point that is confined purely to epistemology, 
but reflects a wider fact applicable to achievements more generally. What determines that 
one’s success is because of one’s ability, and so is a bona fide achievement, is that one’s 
ability explains one’s success. Crucially, however, Greco also argues that “the semantics of 
causal explanation language requires a contextualist treatment.”7 If this is right, then the 
connection between virtue reliabilism and attributer contextualism starts to become apparent.  
 Here is the example that Greco gives to illustrate this point, which is worth quoting in 
full:  
 
Consider […] the cause of a car crash at a major intersection. The police at the scene deem that 
the crash was caused by excessive speed, and accordingly they issue the driver a summons. Later 
in the year, city planners consider the crash along with several others that occurred at the same 
location. They determine that the crash was caused by difficult traffic patterns and recommend 
changes to the Board of Transportation. Who is right, the police or the planners?  
 One wants to say, of course, that they are both right. To say that excessive speed caused the 
crash is to pick out one necessary part of a much broader set of causal conditions. To say that 
difficult traffic patterns caused the crash is to do the same. Plausibly, the different interests and 
purposes governing traffic enforcement and traffic planning make different explanations 
appropriate. City police, in their capacity, appropriately blame the crash on excessive speed, 
considering the difficult traffic patterns to be part of the normal background. City planners, in 
their capacity, appropriately blame the crash on difficult traffic patterns, considering speeding 
drivers to be part of the normal background. What counts as “the explanation” or “the cause” of 
the crash is relative to these different contexts.8  
 
With this point in mind, it should be clear that insofar as knowledge is to be understood in 
such a fashion that it essentially appeals to the idea that the cognitive success in question be 
explained by the relevant cognitive abilities, then it will inherit the kind of context-sensitivity 
exhibited here. Or, as Greco puts the point, “we get the result that knowledge attributions are 
sensitive to context because they involve causal explanations, and causal explanations are 
sensitive to context.”9  
 The example that Greco offers to illustrate the kind of context-sensitivity in 
knowledge ascriptions that he has in mind is that of the gambler. In the first case, the gambler 
says to his wife that he knew that a certain horse would win (a horse that he bet a great deal 
of money on) and is regarded with scepticism (i.e., as if he is speaking falsely). In the second 
                                                
7  J. Greco, ‘What’s Wrong With Contextualism?’, Philosophical Quarterly [this issue], at p. 5? 
8  Ibid. [?] 
9  Ibid. [?] 
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case, the gambler asserts the same sentence in the company of his friends and is treated as 
speaking truly. Greco’s diagnosis of what is going on here is that in the first case the risk of 
losing a large sum of money is what is salient, thereby undermining the salience of the 
gambler’s abilities in picking winning horses. In this context, his success is not because of his 
abilities. Accordingly, it does not constitute an achievement, and so isn’t knowledge. Hence, 
his claim to know is regarded as false. In the second case, in contrast, only the gambler’s 
abilities are treated as salient, and not the inherent riskiness of the bet, and so his success is 
because of his abilities. As a result, his success does constitute an achievement and thus his 
knowledge claim is rightly treated as true. 
 We thus get a form of attributer contextualism about ‘knows’, in the sense that 
whether or not a knowledge ascription expresses a truth can depend upon the context of the 
person making the ascription. If the gambler’s wife is talking about her husband and says ‘He 
didn’t know he would win’, she speaks truly, while if the gambler’s friends are talking about 
the gambler and say ‘He did know he would win’, they would also speak truly. In this sense, 
then, ‘knows’ is a context-sensitive term.  
 Notice, however, that the contextualism in question is tempered by the additional 
story that Greco tells about the core function of our concept of knowledge, which is “to flag 
information and sources of information for use in practical reasoning.”10  This tempers the 
form of contextualism in play because if knowledge is required for practical reasoning, then it 
is essential that knowledge be widely available, and so the standards for knowledge must not 
be too high. Equally, however, if informants are to be of any use to us, then the knowledge 
they convey must be suitably robust. Hence, the standards for knowledge can never be too 
low either. So although Greco allies his virtue epistemology to a form of attributer 
contextualism, the form of contextualism in play is rather modest. 
 So if Greco is right, then virtue reliabilism, properly understood, naturally leads to a
                                                
10  Ibid., at p. 22. [?] 
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modest form of attributer contextualism. I will raise three worries regarding Greco’s 
proposal. The first is ultimately just a quibble regarding the key example he uses to illustrate 
his view, that of the gambler. The second is effectively a request for further argumentation to 
explain why Greco’s line of argument leads to attributer contextualism and not a form of 
epistemological contrastivism. Finally, the third worry I will raise is a more substantive 
concern regarding Greco’s identification of knowledge with cognitive achievement, a thesis 
which is central to his argument.  
 
 
2. THE ‘GAMBLER’ EXAMPLE 
 
First off, let me just state that I don’t like the gambler example that Greco offers one bit. For 
one thing, notice that the example is crucially underdescribed, since it leaves it open whether 
the gambler really does have the relevant ability to pick winners. We tend to think of 
gamblersespecially ones, as in this case, who bet large sums that they can ill-afford to 
loseas rather self-deluded figures who credit themselves with gambling abilities they just 
do not have. If this is how we are to understand the case, however, then there is surely no 
context in which what is salient could ensure that the gambler’s self-ascription of knowledge 
is properly treated as true. On this reading of the example, the gambler’s friends are wrongly 
treating his self-ascription as true, rather than merely having a different conception of what is 
salient. 
 Alternatively, we can imagine a way of reading this case such that the gambler bucks 
the usual stereotype and genuinely has the relevant skill to pick winners. I think this is the 
only credible reading of the example. It is now plausible to suppose that the gambler’s friends 
are right to treat his self-ascription of knowledge as expressing a truth given that they do not 
find the risk of him wrecking the household finances as salient. But what do we now say 
about his wife’s unwillingness to treat his self-ascription as true? If this is due to her 
ignorance of her husband’s bona fide ability to pick winners, then it is surely unfounded.  
 Perhaps, though, the gambler’s wife knows that her husband has these abilities, but 
she simply worries about the risks involved regardless and so treats the possibility that he 
might have wrecked their finances as salient (I think Greco may well have this reading in 
mind, judging by what he says in the text). Accordingly, on this reading although there is in 
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fact no serious risk that the husband may have wrecked their finances with his 
bettingindeed, given his track record, we would in fact reasonably expect him to 
substantially improve them with his bettingthe fact that the gambler’s wife is an extremely 
cautious individual suffices to make the risk salient such that any assertion she made to the 
effect that her husband did not know that he would win would be true.  
 My concern about this reading of the example is that it seems to imply that there is no 
distinction being drawn between what the agent thinks is salient and what the agent properly 
or reasonably thinks is salient. If one followed through this reasoning, then it would seem to 
suggest that the overly cautious amongst usi.e., the unreasonably cautiouscould go 
around asserting that they and others do not know pretty much any proposition with 
impunity. But surely this is not a consequence that anyone would wish to sign up to.  
 Notice that I am not claming here that Greco’s form of attributer contextualism is 
implausible, since my problem is specific to this particular case. My suspicion is that this is 
simply a bad example for Greco to use to illustrate his view. Indeed, given the further thesis 
that Greco offers regarding the main function of the concept of knowledge and how this 
function ensures that the attributer contextualism on offer will be mild in its consequences, it 
strikes me that even Greco ought to want to reject an example like this, since it implies a 
radicalism that is not part of his wider view. That is, given the core function of the concept of 
knowledge that Greco identifies, why would the standards for knowledge go so high as to 
allow the gambler’s wife’s assertion that he does not know to count as true? Alternatively, if 
the gambler really does lack the abilities in question, then why would the standards for 
knowledge drop so low as to allow the gambler’s friends’ assertions that he does know count 
as true? Greco would thus be wise to find another example to illustrate his view, one more 
congenial to his broader outlook. 
  
 
3. KNOWLEDGE AND CONTRASTS 
 
A second worry I have regarding Greco’s paper is a little more substantive. The concern is 
that it is unclear, even by Greco’s own lights, that the argument that he offers which ties 
virtue epistemology to attributer contextualism really goes through. The reason for this is that 
it is very plausible to suppose that causal explanations are best understood along contrastive 
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lines, and thus that if we are to evaluate knowledge ascriptions on the same model as causal 
explanations, then it appears that a contrastivist view, rather than an attributer contextualist 
one, is what is licensed. 
 In order to see this, think again about the example of the car crash that we saw Greco 
offering above. To begin with, it is worth noting that the example is, as it stands, far from 
uncontentious. For instance, it is hard to imagine why a traffic cop, in offering a causal 
explanation of a crash, would decide to ignore the vital fact that the junction can be 
dangerous within the range of speeds normally expected. Similarly, why would a traffic 
planner ignore the fact that the car involved was speeding in offering their causal explanation 
of the crash? (And note that if they weren’t ignoring the relevant fact, but simply unaware of 
it, then that hardly helps matters. Why think that the causal explanation they offer is the right 
one if they are unapprised of all the relevant facts?).  
 Rather than try to rescue the example (which I’m sure can be done), let us focus on a 
less controversial case from the literature. Consider the following example, adapted from one 
described by Steven Rieber.11 Only those people who have syphilis get paresis, but some 
people with syphilis do not get paresis. Now consider the question of what caused a particular 
person, Smith, to get paresis. Suppose one is in a context in which it is part of the background 
that one would not ordinarily expect someone to have syphilis. In such a context, it would 
seem natural to say that it is the fact that Smith has syphilis that explains why he has paresis. 
In contrast, however, suppose that one is in a context in which this is not part of the 
backgroundperhaps one is working in a special section of a hospital which deals with 
patients with syphilis and talking to another member of the medical staff. It would not now be 
natural to say that the fact that Smith has syphilis explains why he has paresis. We thus get a 
kind of context-sensitivity of the general sort that Greco is interested in, in that an assertion 
of the very same causal explanation sentence will berightly, it seemsjudged to be true in 
one context and false in another.  
 Interestingly, however, many commentators on causal explanations do not conclude 
on this basis that we ought to adopt the relevant version of attributer contextualismi.e., that 
the context of the agent uttering the causal explanation sentence determines what truth-value 
this sentence should have. Instead, they opt for a contrastivist treatment of causal 
                                                
11  S. Rieber, ‘Skepticism and Contrastive Explanation’, Noûs, 32 (1998), pp. 189-204, at p. 195. 
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explanations. As regards the example just given, for example, Rieber argues that what counts 
as the right causal explanation all depends on which contrast is salient. For example, if the 
salient contrast is with Jones, who does not have syphilis, then it would be natural to say that 
it is the fact that Smith has syphilis that explains why he has paresis. Alternatively, if the 
salient contrast is with Brown, who has syphilis but not paresis, then this explanation will be 
false.12  
 In effect, what a contrastivist account of causal explanation does is treat causal 
explanation sentences as elliptical, with the relevant contrast implicit. So, for example, it is 
true that the fact that Smith has syphilis explains why he rather than someone who doesn’t 
have syphilis has paresis, but it is also true that the fact that Smith has syphilis does not 
explain why Smith rather than someone who does have syphilis but not paresis has paresis. 
What is crucial to such an account is that it leads to a very different kind of context-
sensitivity to that at issue in attributer contextualism. Whatever context one is in, an assertion 
of the sentence ‘Smith has paresis because he has syphilis’ is true if the contrast is someone 
who doesn’t have syphilis, and false if the contrast is someone who does have syphilis. Put 
another way, once we make the relevant contrast explicit, then there is no further context-
sensitivity at issue.  
 The problem for Greco, however, is that if one extends this contrastivist treatment of 
causal explanation into the epistemological sphere then what one ends up with, it seems, is 
not attributer contextualism about ‘knows’ but rather an epistemological version of 
contrastivism. Given the problems noted above with the ‘gambler’ case that Greco offers, 
consider instead Fred Dretske’s ‘zebra’ case to illustrate this point.13 That the agent in this 
example is able to tell zebras from, say, baboons or giraffes may well explain why she has a 
true belief that what she sees is a zebra rather than the salient contrasts of baboon or giraffe. 
In contrast, the fact that the agent has discriminatory abilities of this sort will not explain why 
she has a true belief that what she sees is a zebra rather than a cleverly disguised mule. As a 
number of epistemological contrastivists have noted, there is no need to opt for attributer 
contextualism once one has gone this far down the contrastivist road.14 Instead, one just 
needs to recognise that there is no such thing as knowing p simpliciter; rather, knowing is 
                                                
12  For another prominent example of a contrastivist treatment of causal explanation, see P. Lipton, ‘Contrastive 
Explanation’, in D. Knowles (ed.), Explanation and its Limits (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990).  
13  F. Dretske, ‘Epistemic Operators’, Journal of Philosophy, 67 (1970), pp. 1007-23. 
14  See, for example, J. Schaffer, ‘Contrastive Knowledge’, Oxford Studies in Philosophy, 1 (2005), pp. 235-72. 
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always to be understood contrastively in terms of knowing that p rather than a set of contrasts 
Q. Relative to one set of contrasts one might be truly said to know pmeaning only that one 
knows p relative to that set of contrastswhereas relative to another set of contrasts one 
might not be truly said to know p. Attributer contextualism doesn’t come into it.  
 I am not meaning to endorse epistemic contrastivism here. My point is only that given 
the line of argument offered by Greco, it is odd that he thinks that the natural outcome of that 
argument is attributer contextualism and not contrastivism, especially when he never 
considers the contrastivist alternative. 
 
 
4. KNOWLEDGE AND ACHIEVEMENT 
 
I noted earlier that a key feature of the virtue-theoretical proposal that Greco offers which 
essentially appeals to causal explanations is that it in effect understands knowledge as a kind 
of achievement. That is, achievements are to be understood as successes that are because of 
ability, and knowledge is to be understood as a cognitive achievementi.e., a cognitive 
success that is because of cognitive ability. This idea has a lot of prima facie appeal, but I do 
not think that it stands up to scrutiny, even given a contextualist semantics for the relevant 
causal explanations that are in play in knowledge ascriptions. The reason for this is that there 
seem to be cases of knowledge which clearly aren’t (by anyone’s lights) cognitive 
achievements, and also cases of cognitive achievements which clearly aren’t (by anyone’s 
lights) cases of knowledge.  
 To appreciate this point, let us first reflect on what is involved in non-cognitive 
achievements. Greco is surely right that we should think of achievements as, essentially at 
least, successes that are because of ability. Suppose that I select a target, fire at that target 
with my arrow with the intention of hitting it, and hit the target. If I lack the relevant abilities, 
then this success is just dumb luck, and so not an achievement. Equally, even if I have the 
relevant abilities, but the success is ‘Gettierized’perhaps because a dog jumps up and grabs 
the arrow in flight (which would have hit the target), and then proceeds to place the arrow in 
the targetthen this doesn’t count as an achievement either since the success clearly isn’t 
because of the relevant abilities.  
 But now consider the following case. Suppose that as before I select a target, fire at 
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that target with my arrow with the intention of hitting it, and hit the target. Moreover, let us 
stipulate that I have all the relevant abilities, and that my success is not ‘Gettierized’, at least 
not in the usual fashionthat is, nothing interferes with the arrow during its journey to the 
target. Would this count as an achievement? Surely we would usually say that it did. Now 
suppose further that there is a twist to this case. The target I (randomly) selected is, 
unbeknownst to me, the only target on that range that is not fitted with a hidden forcefield 
which would repel any arrow aimed at it. My success is thus clearly lucky, in the sense that I 
could very easily have not been successful in this case. But is it any less of an achievement 
on this score? I suggest that it isn’t. 
 The moral of such cases is that achievements are entirely consistent with a certain 
kind of lucky success. Interestingly, however, knowledgewhich Greco regards as a 
cognitive achievementis not consistent with lucky success of this sort. In order to see this, 
one needs only to note that the barn façade case has almost exactly the same structure as the 
‘archer’ case just described. Accordingly, by parity of reasoning, one should, it seems, regard 
this as a case of cognitive achievementit is certainly cognitive success through cognitive 
ability that is not ‘Gettierized’ in the normal way. Indeed, wouldn’t we naturally say that the 
cognitive success in this case is because of the agent’s cognitive abilities? The problem is, 
however, that while this cognitive success does seem to count as a bona fide cognitive 
achievement, it doesn’t seem to be a case of knowledge because of the epistemic luck 
involvedthe agent could very easily have been wrong. More specifically, it is hard to 
imagine a context in which one would ascribe knowledge to the agent in the barn façade case 
and speak truly. Hence it seems to be that knowledge is intolerant to luck in a way that 
achievements are not, and this creates a prima facie problem for any proponent of the view 
that knowledge is a kind of achievement.15  
 Moreover, there are also problems for Greco’s view from the opposite direction, since 
there seem to be cases of knowledge which are not cases of cognitive achievements. 
Consider, for example, the following case offered by Jennifer Lackey.16 In this example our 
hero, let’s call her ‘Jenny’, steps off the train in an unfamiliar city seeking directions to a 
                                                
15  I explore the problem posed by barn façade-style cases for Greco’s view further elsewhere. See, for example, 
‘Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck, Revisited’ and ‘Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value’. 
See also J. Kvanvig, ‘Responses to Critics’, in A. Haddock, A. Millar, & D. H. Pritchard (eds.), The Value of 
Knowledge, (Oxford: Oxford UP, forthcoming). 
16  J. Lackey, ‘Why We Don’t Deserve Credit for Everything We Know’, Synthese 156 (2007), at §2. 
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local landmark. Walking up to the first adult passer-by that she sees, she asks for directions. 
The informant is indeed knowledgeable in this regard and conveys this knowledge to Jenny, 
who then locates the landmark in question. In cases like this we surely want to say that Jenny 
knows the way to the landmark. Clearly it is of some credit to Jenny that she is cognitively 
successful in this caseshe wouldn’t ask anyone after all, and she wouldn’t believe anything 
that she is toldbut would we really say that Jenny’s cognitive success is a cognitive 
achievement of hers, as opposed, for example, to being a cognitive achievement on the part 
of the informant? Moreover, is there any context in which we would rightly regard Jenny’s 
cognitive success as being because of her cognitive abilities, rather than, at least in 
substantial part, the cognitive abilities of the informant in question? 
 Now I don’t doubt that there are moves that Greco can make to cases liked this. As 
regards the Lackey case, for example, he could dig his heels in and insist that insofar as this 
is bona fide knowledge, then it must be because of Jenny’s cognitive abilities that her belief 
is true. Similar moves could be made with the barn façade case, perhaps on the grounds that 
to say that there is luck involved in the cognitive success is thereby to say that the cognitive 
success is not because of cognitive ability. Alternatively, Greco could contend that the agent 
doesn’t really have the cognitive ability in this case on account of how abilities are to be 
understood relative to environments, and this just is the wrong environment on this score. Or, 
finally, Greco could contend that there is something special about the cognitive achievement 
at issue when we consider knowledgeperhaps because of the core function of the concept 
of knowledge that we have discussedwhich ensures that it is more resistant to luck than 
other types of achievement.17 
 I have my doubts about all these moves, but this is not the place to explore them.18 
Rather I want to suggest that these problems should persuade Greco to re-evaluate the merits 
of the earlier view that he abandoned, the view on which knowledge has both a virtue-
                                                
17  Greco in fact makes all of these moves at some point or other (which is not to suggest that these moves are 
not complementary, rather than competing). At a number of junctures in ‘What’s Wrong With Contextualism?’, 
for example, he argues that achievement simply excludes luck, the implication presumably being that one can’t 
make sense of a ‘lucky’ achievement in this case (presumably, then, Greco also wants to hold that the archer’s 
success in the corresponding case does not constitute a bona fide achievement either). Moreover, in ‘The Value 
Problem’ he argues that the agent in the barn façade case lacks the relevant cognitive ability. Finally, in an 
unpublished manuscript entitled ‘The Nature of Ability and the Purpose of Knowledge’, he explicitly offers the 
argument that there is something special about the cognitive achievement involved when one knows, such that it 
is more resistant to luck than other cognitive achievements. 
18  I discuss them further in a number of places. See, for example, ‘Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck, 
Revisited’ and ‘Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value’. 
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theoretic component to accommodate the intuition that the reliability in question must reflect 
the agent’s cognitive abilities, and also an anti-luck component that is designed to deal with 
the problem posed by knowledge-undermining epistemic luck (and, thereby, the Gettier-style 
cases).  
 Recall that the key motivation for moving to the later view was that it could deal with 
cases of knowledge-undermining epistemic luck without having to appeal to a separate anti-
luck condition, since cognitive achievements were (or so the thought went) of their nature 
luck-excluding in the relevant sense. The trouble is, however, that the moral of the cases just 
described seems to be that both conditions are required for knowledge. In barn façade-style 
cases, forming one’s belief via one’s cognitive abilities, even to the extent that it qualifies as 
a cognitive achievement, does not suffice for knowledge because of the malignant epistemic 
luck in play (so the virtue-theoretic condition on the later view does not do all the anti-luck 
work that is required of it after all). Conversely, in Lackey-style cases, knowledge is 
possessed even in the absence of a cognitive achievement since it involves a belief that is 
formed through ability in a non-lucky fashion. Thus, the earlier view has, it seems, the 
resources to meet the problems facing the later view that Greco defends.  
 Of course, if Greco returns to the earlier view, and so abandons the knowledge-as-
cognitive-achievement thesis, then the appeal to knowledge being true belief that is because 
of cognitive ability will be lost too. And if that goes, then so too does Greco’s argument, at 
least as it stands, that connects virtue epistemology with attributer contextualism, since causal 
explanations will no longer be playing the required role. A fundamental issue facing Greco’s 
argument for contextualism is thus whether he can adequately motivate the adoption of the 
later view over the former view, and to deal with this problem he will need to do more to 
convince us of the knowledge-as-cognitive-achievement thesis. Perhaps Greco will be able to 
make the compelling case that is required in this regard, but until he does, I think the jury will 
be out on whether virtue epistemology should be allied with attributer contextualism, at least 
in the way (and on the grounds) that Greco suggests.19 
                                                
19  An earlier version of this paper was presented at the ‘Moral Contextualism’ conference at the University of 
Aberdeen in July 2006, and I am grateful to the audience at this event. Thanks also go to Peter Baumann, J. 
Adam Carter, John Greco, Kent Hurtig and an anonymous referee for The Philosophical Quarterly. This paper 
was written whilst in receipt of an Arts and Humanities Research Council research leave award. 
